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Abstract
This paper analyzes the existence and the e⁄ects of bubbles in an
endogenous growth model with ￿nancial frictions and heterogeneous
investments. Bubbles are likely to emerge when the degree of pledge-
ability is in the middle range. This suggests that improving the ￿-
nancial market might enhance the possibility of bubbles. We also ￿nd
that when the degree of pledgeability is relatively low, bubbles boost
long-run growth. When it is relatively high, bubbles lower growth.
Moreover, we examine the e⁄ects of bubbles bursting, and show that
the e⁄ects depend on the degree of pledgeability, i.e., the quality of
the ￿nancial system.
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11 Introduction
Many countries have experienced large movements in asset prices called asset
bubbles. The boom and bust of asset bubbles have been associated with
signi￿cant ￿ uctuations in real economic activity. A notable example is the
recent global economic upturn and downturn before and after the ￿nancial
crisis of 2007. Many economists and policy makers have been anxious to
understand why bubbles emerge and how they a⁄ect real economies,1 but
it is not yet obvious how bubbles a⁄ect economic growth. Moreover, it is
still not clear how ￿nancial market conditions a⁄ect the existence condition
of bubbles. In this paper, we examine how the emergence of asset bubbles
is related to ￿nancial conditions, in other words, whether bubbles are more
likely to occur in ￿nancially developed economies or ￿nancially less-developed
ones. Moreover, we investigate the macroeconomic e⁄ects of bubbles, in the
sense of whether bubbles are growth-enhancing or growth-impairing, and how
those e⁄ects are related to ￿nancial conditions. In the process, we can also
analyze how ￿nancial conditions determine the e⁄ects of bubbles bursting on
the growth rate.
It is recognized that emerging market economies often experience bubble-
like dynamics. As explored by Caballero (2006) and Caballero and Krishna-
murthy (2006), the ￿nancial imperfection or less developed ￿nancial market
is a key element of the existence of bubbles in emerging market economies.
However, if ￿nancial imperfection is the reason for bubbles, why do less de-
veloped countries such as African countries not experience the bubbly econ-
omy? We will show that if the ￿nancial market is very poor and does not
work well, the economic growth rates of less developed countries become too
low to support bubbles. On the other hand, when the ￿nancial market is
working very well, the interest rate becomes high compared to the economic
growth rate and bubbles cannot exist. In this sense, there is a non-linear
relation between the ￿nancial condition of a country and the existence of
bubbles in that country. In other words, bubbles may not occur in ￿nan-
cially underdeveloped or well-developed economies. They can only occur in
￿nancially intermediate-developed ones. In order to capture this intuition,
we use an endogenous growth model with heterogeneous investments and ￿-
nancial market imperfection. In our model, some of the entrepreneurs have
high productive investments and the others have low productive ones and
1See, for example, Akerlof and Shiller (2009).
2entrepreneurs can pledge only a fraction of the returns from the investments.
The endogenous growth model with heterogeneous investments is a cru-
cial point for formulating our intuition about the non-linear relationship. For
example, recently, Farhi and Tirole (2011) examined the existence of bub-
bles and they found that bubbles can exist when the pledgeability level is
low, although their main focus was the e⁄ects of outside liquidity. They
have, however, assumed homogeneous investment opportunities. Hence, if
the pledgeability is very low, the interest rate becomes very low and the
growth rate, which their paper assumes to be zero, becomes relatively high
compared to the interest rate. Thus, bubbles can exist even if the condi-
tion of the ￿nancial market is very poor2. On the other hand, if there are
heterogeneous investments, the market interest rate may not go down very
low even if the ￿nancial market is very poor, since the productivity of the
low productive investment becomes the lowest bound. Thus, the growth rate
becomes very low compared to the interest rate and bubbles cannot exist
when the ￿nancial market condition is very poor. This result suggests that
improving the condition of the ￿nancial market might enhance the emergence
of bubbles if the initial condition of the ￿nancial market is underdeveloped.3
Our model also considers the macroeconomic implications of bubbles.
We will show that the e⁄ect of bubbles on economic growth is dependent
upon the ￿nancial market condition. We will show that bubbles have both a
crowd-out e⁄ect and a crowd-in e⁄ect on investment and growth rate. Since
the existence of bubbles raises the interest rate, it crowds investment out
and decreases the economic growth rate. On the other hand, the rise of the
interest rate increases the net worth of the entrepreneurs. Their increased
net worth crowds in their future investments, that is, the ￿balance sheet
e⁄ect￿works under the ￿nancial imperfection. Our main ￿nding is that the
relative impact of these e⁄ects depends upon the degree of pledgeability. If
the pledgeability level is relatively low, the crowd-in e⁄ect dominates the
crowd-out e⁄ect and the bubbles enhance the economics growth rate. On
the other hand, if the pledgeability is relatively high, the crowd-out e⁄ect
dominates and bubbles decrease the growth rate.
2In Caballero (2006) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), the exogenously given
growth rate in emerging countries is assumed to be high. Thus, even their model cannot
capture the non-linear relationship.
3In this sense, our model is related to Matsuyama (2007, 2008), in which Matsuyama
shows that a better credit market might be more prone to ￿nancing what he calls bad
investments that do not have positive spillover e⁄ects on future generations.
3This examination also holds an important implication for the e⁄ects of
bubble bursts. The above result suggests that the e⁄ect of bubble bursts
is not uniform. It is crucially a⁄ected by the ￿nancial condition of each
country. If the imperfection of the ￿nancial market is relatively high (i.e.,
the pledgeability is relatively low), the bursting of bubbles decreases the
growth rate of the country. On the other hand, the bursts may enhance
the long-run growth rate if the condition of the ￿nancial market is relatively
good.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In subsection 1.1, we
discuss the related works in the literature. In section 2, we present our basic
model and describe the economy without bubbles. In section 3, we introduce
bubbles to this economy and examine the existence conditions of bubbles. In
section 4, we examine the e⁄ects of bubbles on economic growth rates and
show how the e⁄ects are related to ￿nancial market conditions. In section 5,
we examine the e⁄ects of bubbles bursting and in section 6, we conclude our
argument.
1.1 Related Work in the Literature
The present paper considers the existence of bubbles in in￿nitely lived agent
model. With regard to the existence of bubbles in in￿nite horizon economies,
it is commonly thought that bubbles cannot arise in deterministic sequen-
tial market economies with a ￿nite number of in￿nitely lived agents (Tirole,
1982). In the Tirole model, the ￿nancial market is assumed to be perfect,
that is, agents are allowed to borrow and lend freely. Tirole has shown that
in such an environment, no equilibrium with bubbles exists. This result
is consistent with our result. That is, when the pledgeability is equal to
one, which means that the ￿nancial market is perfect, bubbles cannot arise
even in our setting. We show that bubbles can arise even in in￿nitely lived
agents model if the ￿nancial market is imperfect. Of course, the possibil-
ity of bubbles in in￿nite horizon economies with borrowing constraints has
been recognized even in previous papers, including Scheinkman and Weiss
(1986), Kocherlakota (1992), Santos and Woodford (1997), and Hellwig and
Lorenzoni (2009). All of these studies are, however, based on an endowment
economy. Our paper￿ s contribution is that we consider a heterogeneous in-
vestment model and provide a full characterization on the relation between
the existence of bubbles and ￿nancial frictions in a production economy.
There are many papers which examined the relation between bubbles and
4investment. In the literature, however, the crowd-out e⁄ect and crowd-in ef-
fect are examined separately. The conventional wisdom (Samuelson, 1958;
Tirole, 1985) suggests that bubbles crowd investment out and lower output.
According to the traditional view, the ￿nancial market is perfect and all
the savings in the economy ￿ ow to investment. In such a situation, once
bubbles appear in the economy, they crowd savings away from investment.
Saint-Paul (1992), Grossman and Yanagawa (1993), and King and Fergu-
son (1993) extend the Samuelson-Tirole model to economies with endoge-
nous growth, and show that bubbles reduce investment and retard long run
economic growth.45 Recently, however, some researchers such as Woodford
(1990), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), Kiyotaki and Moore (2008),
Kocherlakota (2009), Wang and Wen (2009), Martin and Ventura (2011a)
developed a model with ￿nancial frictions, and showed that bubbles crowd
investment in and increase output.6 In these studies, because of the presence
of ￿nancial market imperfections, enough resources cannot be transferred to
those who have investment from those who do not. As a result, underinvest-
ment occurs. Bubbles help to transfer resources between them.
The novel point of our paper is that we have combined these two e⁄ects
and shown the degree of ￿nancial imperfection is crucial for understanding
which of these e⁄ects is dominant. In this sense, our work is related to Martin
and Ventura (2011b). Martin and Ventura (2011b) also investigated whether
bubbles are expansionary or contractionary. There are some signi￿cant dif-
ferences. First, Martin and Ventura (2011b) assume that nobody can borrow
or lend through ￿nancial markets, because none of the returns from invest-
ment can be pledgeable. That is, they consider a situation where ￿nancial
markets are completely shut down.7 On the other hand, in our model, the
entrepreneurs are allowed to borrow as long as they o⁄er collateral to se-
4This crowd-out e⁄ect of bubbles has been criticized, because it seems inconsistent with
historical evidence that investment and economic growth rate tend to surge when bubbles
pop up, and then stagnate when they burst.
5Olivier (2000) shows that the conclusions in Saint-Paul (1992), Grossman and Yana-
gawa (1993), and King and Ferguson (1993) crucially depend on the type of asset being
speculated on. Bubbles in equity markets can be growth-enhancing while bubbles in un-
productive assets are growth-impairing.
6Aoki and Nikolov (2010), Hirano and Yanagawa (2010), Sakuragawa (2010), and Miao
and Wang (2011) also show the crowd-in e⁄ect of bubbles.
7Even in Woodford (1990), none of the returns from investment can be pledgeable. In
Kocherlakota (2009), agents can borrow against bubbles in land prices. However, without
such bubbles, nobody can borrow and lend.
5cure debts, because our main focus is to investigate the relation between the
degree of ￿nancial imperfection and bubbles. We show that the emergence
of bubbles as well as the e⁄ects of bubbles is crucially dependent upon the
degree of ￿nancial imperfection. Second, Martin and Ventura (2011b) use an
overlapping generations model, and it is assumed that at each period some
fractions of young agents can create new bubbles. This assumption directly
produces wealth e⁄ects of bubbles (crowd-in e⁄ects). They investigated the
conditions of new bubble creations for the existence of bubbles. On the other
hand, our model does not assume such new bubble creations. Instead, we as-
sume that agents live in￿nitely, and their type changes stochastically at each
period. Agents buy bubbles when they are low productive, and sell them at
the time they are high productive, which generates crowd-in e⁄ects.8
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) developed a theory of stochastic
bubbles in emerging markets using an overlapping generations model. In their
model, however, the growth rate of a country and the international interest
rate are exogenously given. They implicitly assumed that the pledgeability
level was low, and that without bubbles the domestic interest rate was lower
than the international interest rate. Hence, our argument is a generalization
of their argument. The theory by Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) is also relevant.
In their theory, since ￿at money (bubble) facilitates exchange for its high
liquidity, people hold money even though the rate of return on it is low, that
is money (bubble) works as a medium of exchange. In our model, however,
we focus on the role of bubbles as a store of value.
2 The Model
Consider a discrete-time economy with one homogeneous good and a con-












8Our paper uses an in￿nitely lived agens model, while Farhi and Tirole (2011) and
Martin and Ventura (2011) are based on an overlapping generations model. The potential
bene￿t of using an in￿nitely lived agents model is that as Farhi and Tirole point out, it is
in principle more suitable for realistic quantitative explorations.
6where i is the index for each entrepreneur, and ci
t is the consumption of him at
date t. ￿ 2 (0;1) is the subjective discount factor, and E0 [x] is the expected
value of x conditional on information at date 0.
At each date, each entrepreneur meets high productive investment projects
(hereinafter H-projects) with probability p, and low productive investments










t(￿ 0) is the investment level at date t and yi
t+1 is the output at
date t + 1. ￿i
t is the marginal productivity of investment at date t. ￿i
t =
￿H if the entrepreneur has H-projects, and ￿i
t = ￿L if he has L-projects.
We assume ￿H > ￿L.10 The probability p is exogenous, and independent
across entrepreneurs and over time. At the beginning of each date t, the
entrepreneur knows his own type at date t, whether he has H-projects or
L-projects. Assuming that the initial population measure of each type of the
entrepreneur is one at date 0, the population measure of each type after date
1 is 2p and 2 ￿ 2p, respectively. We call the entrepreneurs with H-projects
(L-projects) "H-entrepreneurs" ("L-entrepreneurs").
In this economy, we assume that because of frictions in a ￿nancial market,
the entrepreneur can pledge at most a fraction ￿ of the future return from
his investment to creditors.11 In such a situation, in order for debt contracts
to be credible, debt repayment cannot exceed the pledgeable value. That is,








where rt and bi
t are the gross interest rate, and the amount of borrowing
9A similar setting is used in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Kiyotaki (1998), Kiyotaki
and Moore (2008), and Kocherlakota (2009). In Woodford (1990), the entrepreneurs have
investment opportunities in alternating periods.
10We can also consider the model where capital goods is produced by the investment
technology. For example, let ki
t+1 = ￿i
tzi
t be the investment technology, where k is capital
goods. Capital fully depreciates in one period. Consumption goods is produced by the





t , where K and N are the
aggregate capital and labor input, and ￿ k is per-labor capital of the economy, capturing
the externality in order to generate endogenous growth. In this type of the model, we can
obtain the same results as this paper.
11See Hart and Moore (1994) and Tirole (2006) for the foundations of this setting.
7at date t, respectively. The parameter ￿ 2 [0;1], which is assumed to be
exogenous, can be naturally taken to be the degree of imperfection of the
￿nancial market.












The left hand side of (4) is expenditure on consumption and investment.
The right hand side is ￿nancing which comes from the return from investment
in the previous period minus debts repayment, and borrowing. We de￿ne the














t , where Ht and Lt mean a family of H-















t be the aggregate investment and the
aggregate borrowing of each type. Then, the market clearing condition for


















t ￿ Yt is the aggregate output at date t.

















t=0, such that (i) the mar-
ket clearing conditions, (5) and (6), are satis￿ed, and (ii) each entrepreneur
chooses consumption, borrowing, investment, and output to maximize his











t) = 0: (7)
From the maximization problem of the entrepreneur, the borrowing con-
straint, (3), becomes binding if and only if ￿i
t > rt, that is, the rate of return
8on investment is strictly greater than the interest rate.12 In equilibrium, since
the utility function is log-linear, each entrepreneur consumes a fraction 1￿￿
of the net worth every period, that is, ci
t = (1 ￿ ￿)(yi
t ￿ rt￿1bi
t￿1).13
2.2 The Case with ￿ = 1 : Perfect Financial Market
First, let us consider the case with a perfect ￿nancial market, that is ￿ = 1. In
this case, if ￿H > rt; H-entrepreneur must be willing to borrow an unlimited
amount. On the other hand, if ￿L < ￿H < rt; nobody would borrow. Thus,
the equilibrium interest rate must be
rt = ￿
H:
Since each entrepreneur saves a fraction ￿ of the net worth every period,
the aggregate saving in the economy is ￿Yt; which ￿ ows to ￿nance H-projects.
Thus, the law of motion of the aggregate output becomes
Yt+1 = ￿
H￿Yt; (8)






We observe that the growth rate is independent of wealth distribution.
Since we have assumed simple linear production functions, the interest rate is
equal to the marginal productivity of H-projects and the steady state growth
rate is positive. Moreover, the interest rate is strictly greater than the growth
rate of the economy and the transversality condition is satis￿ed, as explored
in the traditional literature.
2.3 The Case with ￿ < 1 : Imperfect Financial Market
Next, we examine the case with an imperfect ￿nancial market, that is ￿ < 1.
Even if ￿ < 1, all of the total saving is used for H-projects and rt = ￿H
as long as ￿ is su¢ ciently high. Hence, in this section, we focus on the case
where the interest rate is strictly lower than ￿H and the borrowing constraint
12The detail analysis of the maximization problem is given in Appendix 1.
13See, for example, chapter 1.7 of Sargent (1988).
9is binding for H-enterpreneurs,
￿
L ￿ rt < ￿
H:
In equilibrium, the interest rate must be at least as high as ￿L, since nobody
lends to the projects if rt < ￿L. We will explore later that which range of ￿
satis￿es the above condition about rt.
Since each entrepreneur consumes a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of the net worth, we










On the other hand, as long as rt < ￿H, the borrowing constraint, (3), is
binding and bi









From those two relations, we can derive the following investment function











This is a popular investment function under ￿nancial constraint problems.14







t￿1). The leverage increases with ￿ and is greater than
one in equilibrium. This implies that when ￿ is larger, H-entrepreneurs can
￿nance more investment, zi
t.














t is the aggregate net worth of H-entrepreneurs at date
t. The movement of the aggregate net worth of H-entrepreneurs evolves
14See, for example, Bernanke et al. (1999), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), and Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997).













t￿1) = pYt: (12)
The ￿rst term of (12) represents the aggregate net worth of the entrepreneurs
who continue to have H-projects from the previous period (we call these H-H
entrepreneurs). The second term represents the aggregate net worth of the
entrepreneurs who switch from the state with L-projects to the state with
H-projects (we call these L-H entrepreneurs). Since every entrepreneur has
the same opportunity to invest in H-projects at each period, the aggregate
net worth of H-entrepreneurs at date t is a fraction p of the aggregate output









For L-entrepreneurs, if rt = ￿L, lending and borrowing to invest are indif-
ferent. Thus, how much they invest in their own projects is indeterminate at
an individual level. However, their aggregate investments￿level is determined





t = ￿Yt: (14)
This implies that the aggregate investments of L-entrepreneurs equal the
aggregate saving minus the aggregate investments of H-entrepreneurs. On
the other hand, if rt > ￿L, ZL




t (rt ￿ ￿
L) = 0; Z
L
t ￿ 0; rt ￿ ￿
L ￿ 0: (15)























where lt ￿ ZL
t =￿Yt, the ratio of the low productive investment to the total
investment. The interpretation of this relation is simple. As long as the
amount of L-projects, lt, is zero, the total savings is allocated to the H-
projects, and the growth rate of this economy becomes ￿￿H, which is just
the same as that under the perfect ￿nancial market. If lt > 0, however,
the di⁄erence in productivity between H-projects and L-projects, ￿H ￿ ￿L,
decreases the growth rate and gt becomes ￿￿H ￿ (￿H ￿ ￿L)￿lt.
Next, we examine the equilibrium level of lt and how the equilibrium lt
is a⁄ected by the degree of ￿nancial imperfection, ￿. Since lt ￿ ZL
t =￿Yt =
(￿Yt ￿ ZH
t )= ￿Yt, we can rewrite lt and gt as follows,






rt(1 ￿ p) ￿ ￿￿H






H ￿ rt)￿l(rt;￿): (18)
From (15), the following relations must be satis￿ed,
(rt ￿ ￿
L)
rt(1 ￿ p) ￿ ￿￿H
rt ￿ ￿￿H = 0; lt ￿ 0; rt ￿ ￿
L ￿ 0: (19)
Those imply that rt must be ￿L or ￿￿H=(1￿p). If ￿￿H=(1￿p) ￿ ￿L, rt = ￿L
since rt cannot be lower than ￿L. On the other hand, if ￿￿H=(1 ￿ p) > ￿L,
rt = ￿￿H=(1 ￿ p) since lt cannot be negative. Hence, we get the following
relation.
rt = r(￿) =
8
> > > <
> > > :





; if (1 ￿ p)
￿L
￿H ￿ ￿ < 1 ￿ p;
12and
lt = l(r(￿);￿) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
￿L(1 ￿ p) ￿ ￿￿H
￿L ￿ ￿￿H ; if 0 ￿ ￿ < (1 ￿ p)
￿L
￿H;
0 if (1 ￿ p)
￿L
￿H ￿ ￿ < 1 ￿ p:
From those results, we get the following equilibrium growth rate.
gt = g(￿) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
￿￿H ￿ (￿H ￿ ￿L)￿
￿L(1 ￿ p) ￿ ￿￿H
￿L ￿ ￿￿H ; if 0 ￿ ￿ < (1 ￿ p)
￿L
￿H;
￿￿H; if (1 ￿ p)
￿L
￿H ￿ ￿ < 1 ￿ p;
(20)
(20) implies that the growth rate of the economy, gt; is an increasing
function of ￿. More savings ￿ ow to H-projects from L-projects through the
relaxation of the borrowing constraint, which improves the aggregate total
factor productivity and enhances growth.15Moreover, from the above relation,
we can ￿nd that if ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ p, rt = ￿H and gt = ￿￿H.
In summary, we get the following proposition.
Proposition 1 When ￿ < 1 and bubbles do not exist, the equilibrium interest
rate, rt, and the equilibrium growth rate, gt, are the following increasing
functions of ￿; respectively.
rt = r(￿) =
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :





; if (1 ￿ p)
￿L
￿H ￿ ￿ < 1 ￿ p;
￿H; if 1 ￿ p ￿ ￿:
15The recent macroeconomic literature emphasizes the role of total factor productivity
in accounting for business cycles or growth. In our model, the aggregate total factor pro-
ductivity is endogenously determined depending on saving allocations between H-projects
and L-projects, which in turn depends on ￿ in the steady state.
13gt = g(￿) =
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
￿￿H ￿ (￿H ￿ ￿L)￿
￿L(1 ￿ p) ￿ ￿￿H
￿L ￿ ￿￿H ; if 0 ￿ ￿ < (1 ￿ p)
￿L
￿H;
￿￿H; if (1 ￿ p)
￿L
￿H ￿ ￿ < 1 ￿ p;
￿￿H; if 1 ￿ p ￿ ￿:
If 0 ￿ ￿ < (1 ￿ p)￿L=￿H, the degree of pledgeability is so small, i.e.,
￿nancial frictions are so severe, then it is di¢ cult for the ￿nancial system
to transfer all the savings of the L-entrepreneurs to H-projects. As a result,
L-entrepreneurs hold idle savings and end up with investing such idle savings
in their own projects with low returns. The more severe ￿nancial frictions
are, the more L-projects are ￿nanced in the economy. However, as ￿nancial
frictions improve, more savings ￿ ow to H-projects. This improvement in
savings allocations increases the aggregate total factor productivity, which
leads to higher growth. On the other hand, the interest rate is suppressed at
a low level of ￿L because of the severity of ￿nancial frictions.
If (1 ￿ p)￿L=￿H ￿ ￿ < 1 ￿ p, L-entrepreneurs can lend all their savings
to H-entrepreneurs, even though the ￿nancial market is still imperfect. As
a result, only H-entrepreneurs invest. Hence, the economy￿ s growth rate is
￿￿H. In this region, together with an improvement in ￿nancial frictions, the
interest rate rises due to the tightness in the ￿nancial market. Note that
the borrowing constraint is still binding for H-entrepreneurs in this region,
because the interest rate is strictly lower than the rate of return on H-projects.
If 1 ￿ p ￿ ￿, and the degree of pledgeability is large enough, the interest
rate is equal to the rate of return on H-projects. The interest rate becomes
equal to the rate of return on H-projects, and H-entrepreneurs does not face
credit constraints. The ￿nancial system can allocate all the savings in the
economy to H-projects, and resource allocation is e¢ cient, even though ￿ is
strictly less than one.16 In this region, the characteristics of the economy is
the same as the one with the perfect ￿nancial market.
Figure 1 depicts this situation. On the horizontal axis, we take ￿, and
on the vertical axis, we take g and r: We show that the relation between g




; which is strictly
greater than rt that L-entrepreneurs earn. Thus, income distribution is di⁄erent between
the entrepreneurs. However, in ￿ 2 [1 ￿ p;1], both entrepreneurs earn the same rate of
return, which is ￿H: Hence, there is no di⁄erence in income distribution.
14and ￿ is nonlinear. As shown below, this nonlinearity plays a crucial role in
creating regions where bubbles can arise (bubble regions), or regions where
they cannot arise (non-bubble regions).
3 Existence of Asset Bubbles
Now we describe the economy with asset bubbles (we call this a "bubble
economy"). We de￿ne bubble assets as the assets that produce no real return,
i.e., the fundamental value of the assets is zero. Let xi
t be the level of bubble
assets purchased by type i entrepreneur at date t, and let Pt be the per unit
price of bubble assets at date t in terms of consumption goods. 17 In the
bubble economy, each entrepreneur faces the following three constraints: ￿ ow































t ￿ 0; (23)
where ￿ represents the case of bubble economy. Both sides of (21) include
bubbles. Ptxi
t￿1 in the right hand side is the sales of the bubble assets, and
Ptxi
t in the left hand side is the new purchase of them. We de￿ne the net worth






(22) is the borrowing constraint under the bubble economy. We assume here
that only a fraction ￿ of the returns from the investment and the bubbles
can be pledgeable to creditors. Of course, we can think about a di⁄erent
situation in which the pledgeable fraction on the return on the investment
and that of the return on the bubbles are di⁄erent. Even if we assume that
the pledgeable fraction of bubbles￿return, say ￿
x < 1, is di⁄erent from that
of the investment￿ s return, ￿, our results which will be explained below are
not a⁄ected.18
We should add a few remarks about the short-sale constraint (23). As
Kocherlakota (1992) has shown, the short-sale constraint is important for
17Here we only focus on deterministic bubbles but, even if we allow stochastic bubbles,
our qualitative properties are not a⁄ected as shown in Appendix 2.
18As will be explained below, the crucial point for our results is that the previous return
from bubbles increases the net worth for a borrower.
15the existence of bubbles in deterministic economies with a ￿nite number of
in￿nitely lived agents. Without the constraint, bubbles always represent an
arbitrage opportunity for an in￿nitely lived agent; he can gain by perma-
nently reducing his holdings of the asset. However, it is well known that
in such economies, equilibria can only exist if agents are constrained not to
engage in Ponzi schemes. Kocherlakota (1992) has demonstrated that the
short-sale constraint is one of no-Ponzi-game conditions and hence, it can
support bubbles by eliminating the agent￿ s ability to permanently reduce his
holdings of the asset.19
In order that bubble assets be held in equilibrium, the rate of return on







Each entrepreneur chooses the levels of consumption, investment, output,









; to maximize the expected
utility (1) subject to (21), (22), and (23), given the interest rate and the cur-
rent and future price of bubbles, r￿
t;Pt; and Pt+1. Moreover, on the optimal








t = 0: (25)
In equilibrium, as before, the entrepreneur consumes a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of
the net worth every period.21 As in the previous section, we focus on the case
where the equilibrium interest rate is strictly lower than the productivity of
the H-projects, that is, L-entrepreneurs purchase bubbles and the borrowing
constraint on H-entrepreneurs is binding. The investment function of the











19See Kocherlakota (1992) for details.
20See Kocherlakota (1992) for the transversality condition in economies with the short
sale constraint.











for H-H entrepreneurs. For L-H entrepreneurs, since they purchased bubbles
in the previous period, they are able to sell bubbles at the time they en-
counter H-projects. As a result, their net worth increases (compared to the
bubbleless case) and boosts their investments, that is, the "balance sheet ef-
fect" works.22 Moreover, the expansion level of the investment is more than
the direct increase of net worth because of the leverage e⁄ect. H-H entrepre-
neurs, however, are not able to take advantage of this merit, because they
did not buy bubbles in the previous period.
Next, we describe the aggregate economy. Since both H-and L-entrepreneurs
consume a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of their net worth, the goods market clearing con-
dition can be written as
Z
￿H
t + PtX = ￿(Y
￿
t + PtX); (26)
where Y ￿
t +PtX and ￿(Y ￿
t +PtX) are the aggregate wealth (total asset) and
the aggregate saving in the bubble economy. X is the aggregate quantity of
bubbles, which is exogenously ￿xed. We see that some of the aggregate saving
￿ ow to bubble assets as well as H-projects, which can be the source for raising
the interest rate in the ￿nancial market. The aggregate demand for bubbles,
PtX, is equal to the aggregate saving minus the aggregate investment of
H-entrepreneurs, ￿(Y ￿
t + PtX) ￿ Z￿H
t .












t = p(Y ￿
t ￿ r￿
t￿1B￿H
t￿1) + p(PtX ￿ r￿
t￿1B￿L
t￿1) = p(Y ￿
t + PtX). The
￿rst term is the aggregate net worth of H-H entrepreneurs at date t and the












22In Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the rise in land price increases the entrepreneurs￿net
worth, which results in balance sheet e⁄ects, thereby increasing investment. In this paper,
bubbles play a similar role as the land in Kiyotaki and Moore￿ s paper.
17The aggregate wealth under the bubble economy can be written as,
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where kt is the relative size of bubbles and gk
t is the growth rate of the
aggregate wealth, Y ￿



















+ ￿kt = ￿: (30)





















t(1 ￿ p) ￿ ￿￿H
r￿
t ￿ ￿￿H = l(r
￿
t;￿): (31)
This means that given rt and ￿, the relative size of bubbles, kt, is just equal
to the relative size of L-projects, lt = l(rt;￿) under the bubbleless economy.












This means the growth rate function in the bubble economy is just same as
the bubbleless economy. However, the growth rate becomes di⁄erent since
the equilibrium interest rate is di⁄erent.
Next we examine the determination process of r￿










￿H￿ ￿ (￿H ￿ rt)￿kt
: (32)









should be satis￿ed. Moreover, if kt+1=kt < 1, the economy converges to the
asymptotically bubbleless economy. Hence, in this paper, we focus on the
case where kt+1=kt = 1, that is, the share of the bubble assets is constant








From (31) and kt+1=kt = 1, we get the equilibrium interest rate and the
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￿(1 ￿ p) ￿ ￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
:
Furthermore, since the growth rate of the total output, g￿















H(1 ￿ ￿)￿ + p￿
1 ￿ ￿ + p￿
: (35)
Obviously, the equilibrium growth rate is an increasing function of ￿. An
increase of ￿ decreases the relative size of bubbles, kt, and raises the growth
rate.
193.1 Existence Condition of Bubbles
In this subsection, we examine the existence condition of bubbles. For the
existence of bubbles, the following two conditions must be satis￿ed. First, the
equilibrium interest rate must not be lower than ￿L at each period. Second,




H(1 ￿ ￿)￿ + p￿





￿(1 ￿ p) ￿ ￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
> 0:
From these conditions, we get the following proposition(Hereafter, proofs of
all Propositions are in Appendix 1).











￿ ￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p):
From this proposition, we can understand that bubbles tend to exist when
the degree of ￿nancial imperfection, ￿, is in the middle range. In other words,
improving the condition of the ￿nancial market might enhance the existence
of bubbles when the initial condition of ￿ is low.23 This result is in sharp
contrast with the results in the previous literature such as Farhi and Tirole
(2010), in which bubbles are more likely to emerge when the ￿nacial market
is more imperfect (when the pledgeability is more limited).
Figure 2 is a typical case representing the relation between ￿ and bubble
regions.24 It is shown that if the degree of ￿nancial frictions is su¢ ciently
23Researchers such as Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Allen and Gale (1999) point
out that ￿nancial liberalization causes bubbles. An interpretation of this e⁄ect based on
our model is as follows. For instance, before ￿nancial liberalization, the economy is in
non-bubble regions. After the liberalization, ￿ increases, and the borrowing constraint is
relaxed, so that the economy enters bubble regions. Consequently, we might think of the
increase in ￿ as a measure of ￿nancial liberalization.
24Even though the growth rate is strictly greater than the interest rate, bubbles cannot
arise in the economy unless people expect to be able to pass bubbles on to other people.
20large or small, bubbles can not exist. This suggests that in ￿nancially under-
developed or well-developed economies, bubbles can not emerge. They can
only arise in ￿nancially intermediate-developed ones.25 An intuitive reason
for this result is as follows. If ￿ is low, H-entrepreneurs cannot borrow suf-
￿ciently and the growth rate must be low even with bubbles. On the other
hand, the interest rate cannot be lower than ￿L; since there is an opportunity
to invest in L-projects even if ￿ is low. Hence, under a very low ￿ level, the
interest rate becomes higher than the growth rate and bubbles cannot exist.
Since we assume heterogeneous investment opportunities, the interest rate
has the lowest bound and we can obtain the result that is di⁄erent from the
previous literature.26
Moreover, we can use the structure of the bubbleless economy to char-
acterize the existence condition. The existence condition of the bubble is
that the growth rate is not lower than the interest rate under the bubbleless
economy. This condition is consistent with the existence condition in the
previous literature such as Tirole(1985).
Proposition 3 The necessary condition for the existence of bubble is that
the equilibrium growth rate is not lower than the equilibrium interest rate
under the bubbleless economy.
This expectation is the su¢ cient condition for the existence of bubbles. Here, we assume
that the condition is satis￿ed when bubbles appear.
25Readers may wonder why the phenomenon which looks like bubbles occurs repeatedly
in the real world where the ￿nancial system is continually developing over time, even
though our model suggests that bubbles do not appear in high ￿ regions. We propose
one interpretation from our model. In the paper, we assume a common ￿ on both high
and low investment. However, we can put di⁄erent ￿ on those projects. In such a case,
the important factor for the existence of bubbles is ￿
H; which is placed on high-pro￿t
investments, not on low-pro￿t investments. Taking this into account, consider the situation
where the existing projects with ￿L disappear, and new investment opportunities with
higher pro￿tability than the existing ￿H appear in the economy. In such a situation, the
￿ that is placed on those new projects is important for the existence of bubbles. If the ￿
is low, the economy will enter bubble regions again even if it was in non-bubble regions
with high ￿ before. In the real world, this process might repeat itself.
26Martin and Ventura (2010) assume two types of investment opportunities but bubbles
may be able to exist in an economy without credit markets. The crucial di⁄erence is that
their paper allows new bubble creations at each period.
214 Asset Bubbles and Economic Growth
In this section, we examine how bubbles a⁄ect the economic growth rate. We
will show here that the e⁄ect of bubbles on the growth rate is dependent on
the ￿nancial market condition, ￿, even if the existence condition of bubbles
is satis￿ed. We can derive that there is a threshold level of ￿, ￿
￿ = ￿(1 ￿
p)￿L=￿H:
Proposition 4 Let us de￿ne ￿
￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p)￿L=￿H. If ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿, the
growth rate under the bubble economy is higher than that under the bubbleless
economy at each period. If ￿
￿ < ￿ < ￿, the growth rate under the bubble
economy is lower than that under the bubbleless economy at each period.
Proposition 4 implies that in the economies within the bubble regions and
with relatively low ￿, bubbles enhance growth while in the economies with
relatively high ￿, they impede it. Here we explain an intuitive reason of this













The di⁄erence between the two growth rates arises mainly from the di⁄erence
in the interest rates. When bubbles appear in the economy, the interest rate
rises, which produces two competing e⁄ects. One is a crowd-out e⁄ect. That
is, H-entrepreneurs are forced to cut back on their investments because they
experience tight borrowing constraints. This reduces the growth rate of the
aggregate net worth of H-entrepreneurs, which in turn crowds investment
out. The other is a crowd-in e⁄ect. Due to the hike in the interest rate, the
interest income for L-entrepreneurs, which is the returns from purchasing
bubbles, rises. This increases the growth rate of the aggregate net worth of
H-entrepreneurs, which in turn crowds investment in. More precisely, the
di⁄erence between the growth rates can be written as follows.
g
￿








In this formulation, the ￿rst term of the right hand side represents the crowd-
in e⁄ect and the second term of the right hand side represents the crowd-out
e⁄ect. Since r￿(￿) ￿ ￿L, the ￿rst term is (weakly) positive. This term
22captures the e⁄ect that an increase in the interest rate raises the income of
the entrepreneurs who invested in the bubbles and enhances the economic
growth rate. More precisely, if there is no bubble, some L-entrepreneurs have
to invest in L-projects, l(￿L;￿), as long as the borrowing constraint binds the
H-entrepreneurs. If they have a chance to invest in bubble assets instead of
L-projects, they can earn r￿(￿)l(￿L;￿) instead of ￿Ll(￿L;￿). This increased
earning contributes to enhancing the H-investment at the time they become
H-entrepreneurs in the future. Thus, this income e⁄ect increases the growth
rate by the increase of H-investments.
The second term represents the crowd-out e⁄ect. As you can see from
(17), l(r￿;￿) is an increasing function of r￿. A rise in the interest rate tightens
the borrowing constraint of the H-entrepreneuers and increases the invest-
ments in the L-projects or bubbles. Hence, l(r￿(￿);￿) ￿ l(￿L;￿) is positive.
Under the bubble economy, if ￿ is low, ￿l(￿L;￿) is high and the crowd-in
e⁄ect is high. On the other hand, if ￿ is high, ￿l(￿L;￿) becomes low and the
crowd-in e⁄ect is dominated by the crowd-out e⁄ect. Thus, in the economies
with relatively low ￿, the crowd-in e⁄ect dominates the crowd-out e⁄ect, but,
in the economies with relatively high ￿, the crowd-out e⁄ect dominates the
crowd-in e⁄ect.27
Here, we will add a few remarks on the e⁄ect of bubbles on aggregate
productivity. In the bubble economy, L-entrepreneurs stop investing and
only H-entrepreneurs invest, i.e., bubbles improve e¢ ciency in production by
eliminating low-productive investments. Thus, the total factor productivity
increases together with the emergence of bubbles. It moves procyclically with
economic growth if ￿ is relatively low. This implies that bubble bursts results
in productive ine¢ ciency.
5 E⁄ects of the Bubbles Bursting
In this section, we examine the e⁄ects of bubble bursts. In this perfect
foresight model, an unexpected shock may generate a burst of bubbles.28
27In our model, the presence of L-projects plays a crucial role in showing that bubbles
crowd investment in and enhance growth. Without them, in the bubbleless economy, the
interest rate adjusts such that all the savings in the economy ￿ ow to H-projects. In such
a situation, once bubble assets appear in the economy, they crowd savings away from
H-projects, thereby lowering the growth.
28When we assume stochastic bubbles, bubbles can burst even without exogenous shocks.
The e⁄ects of bubbles bursting are examined in Appendix 2 and we can show that qual-
23Let us suppose that there is an unexpected shock at t = s that decreases the
productivity from ￿H to ￿S < ￿H. First, we examine the case where this
shock is permanent (or at least this shock is expected to be permanent at
t = s.). As we have shown in the previous section, ￿￿H ￿ ￿L is a necessary
condition for the existence of bubbles. Hence, if ￿S is strictly smaller than
￿L=￿, bubbles must burst for any ￿. Even if ￿S ￿ ￿L=￿, bubbles may burst
if ￿ is relatively low. Since ￿ is a decreasing function of ￿H, bubbles must
collapse in the countries whose pledgeability is lower than ￿(￿S). This result
shows that even if the shock is common, the e⁄ect of the shock di⁄ers from
country to country and in particular, the e⁄ect on the stock price in a country
is crucially a⁄ected by the ￿nancial market conditions of this country.
Next, we examine how the growth rate in each country is a⁄ected by the
unexpected shock at t = s. After the collapse of bubbles, the growth rate
is determined by the mechanism explained in Section 2. Hence, the growth
rate after the shock becomes,
gt = g(￿) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
￿￿S ￿ (￿S ￿ ￿L)￿
￿L(1 ￿ p) ￿ ￿￿S
￿L ￿ ￿￿S if 0 ￿ ￿ < (1 ￿ p)
￿L
￿S;
￿￿S; if (1 ￿ p)
￿L
￿S ￿ ￿ ￿ 1:
Since the productivity is lower than before, the growth rate becomes lower
than that of the bubble periods. Although the growth rate under the bubble
economy is not lower than ￿L, the growth rates must be lower than ￿L after
the burst when ￿￿S < ￿L. Furthermore, the variance in growth rates among
countries becomes higher after the burst. The reason is as follows. The
countries whose ￿ is ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ experienced relatively high growth rate
due to the existence of bubbles. This means that after the bubbles burst,
those countries experience decreased growth rate due to the two reasons,
the decreased productivity and the burst bubbles. Hence, those countries
experience relatively very low growth rate after the bubbles burst. On the
other hand, the countries whose ￿ is ￿
￿ < ￿ < ￿ su⁄er decreased growth
rate due to the decrease in productivity, but this e⁄ect must be o⁄set by
the burst￿ s positive e⁄ect on the growth rate, since the existence of bubbles
decreased the growth rates of those countries. In summary, the low (high) ￿
itative properties of bubbles bursting are almost the same even if we assume stochastic
bubbles.
24countries experience relatively lower (higher) growth rates; thus the variance
in growth rate becomes higher even though the average growth rate must be
lower than before the burst. This result may be consistent with an empirical
observation. Figure 3 shows the growth rates of Asian countries before and
after the ￿nancial crisis. The ￿gure shows that the variance in the growth
rates becomes higher after the crisis. Although, actual growth rates will be
a⁄ected by many factors, our result is not inconsistent with this interesting
observation.
Next we examine the case where the unexpected shock is temporary and
it is expected to be so after the shock. In this case, bubbles might exist
even after the shock since all agents can expect that this shock is temporary.
In order to sustain the bubble path after the shock, however, the price of
bubbles, Ps; must drop according to the shock. The reason is as follows. Let
us suppose the shock is temporary and that the productivity recovers to ￿H
after t = s + 1. Under the shock, from t = s + 1, the growth rate of each
country can recover to g￿
t(￿) but Yt must be lower since Ys+1 is decreased by
the shock. Hence, in order to sustain the bubble path, the price of bubbles
must decrease at t = s. This result suggests that the decrease in asset prices
does not directly mean that the bubbles burst. It might be the adjustment
process of bubbles. Even after the drop in asset prices, bubbles can exist
even under the perfect foresight economy as long as there is an unexpected
shock.
It is not necessary, however, that people continue to choose the bubble
path even after the unexpected shock. People may choose the bubbleless path
after the shock. Hence, bubbles may burst if agents revise their expectation
as a result of the shock and expect that the value of the bubble is zero even
if the productivity shock is temporary and ￿H recovers to the original level
at t = s + 1. Next, we examine how the bubble bursts a⁄ect the economic
growth rates in this case. Since the bubbles have burst at t = s, the growth
rate follows (20) from t = s + 1. This implies that the di⁄erence between
the growth rates before and after the bubbles burst can be characterized
by the di⁄erence between the growth rates of the bubble economy and the
bubbleless economy. Hence, if ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿, the growth rate becomes lower
after the bubbles burst but if ￿
￿ < ￿ < ￿, the growth rate becomes higher
(except t = s) after the bubbles burst.29 This result suggests that the e⁄ect of
29In the standard real business cycle models, a temporary productivity shock has only
temporal e⁄ects on output. However, in our model, even a small temporary shock on
25bubble bursts is not uniform. It is crucially a⁄ected by the ￿nancial condition
of each country. If the imperfection of the ￿nancial market is relatively high,
the bursting of bubbles decreases the growth rate of the country but the
bursts may enhance the long run growth rate if the condition of the ￿nancial
market is relatively good. This point is shown in Figure 4.30 In other words,
the bubbles bursting explores the "true" economic condition of each country.
This result also means that the variance in growth rates among countries
becomes higher and, once again, this result is consistent with the observation
in Figure 3.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we assumed the imperfection of the ￿nancial markets and ex-
amined the e⁄ects of bubbles under the imperfect ￿nancial market condition.
We explored how the existence condition of bubbles is related to the condi-
tion of the ￿nancial market and how the middle range of pledgeability allows
for the existence of bubbles. This suggests that improving the condition of
the ￿nancial market might enhance the possibility of bubbles if the initial
condition of the ￿nancial market is underdeveloped.31 Moreover, the e⁄ects
of bubbles on the economic growth rates are also related to the ￿nancial
market￿ s condition. If the pledgeability is relatively low, bubbles increase
the growth rate; but bubbles decrease the growth rate if the pledgeability is
relatively high. This result has an important implication for the e⁄ects of
bubble bursts. The bursting of the bubbles decreases the growth rate when
productivity of the entrepreneurs￿investment has permanent e⁄ects on the aggregate pro-
ductivity and the long run growth rate.
30If ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿; the growth rate at t = s might be higher than t = s￿1 if the temporary
shock is not so large since the growth rate is enhanced by the burst of bubbles even at
t = s.
31In our model, the volatility of the growth rate is high when ￿ is in the middle range,
because bubbles can occur. This may be consistent with the empirical evidences such as
Easterly et al. (2000), and Kunieda (2008), which shows that macroeconomic volatility is
high when ￿nancial development is an intermediated level. As theoretical papers, there
are Aghion et al. (1999), and Matsuyama (2007, 2008), in which they show that macroeco-
nomic volatility is high when the ￿nancial market is intermediatedly developed. However,
the source of high volatility is di⁄erent between these papers and ours. In our paper, it is
from the appearance of bubbles, while in their papers, it comes from the interest rate or
quality of investments.
26the condition of the ￿nancial market is not so good, but the bursts may
enhance the growth rate when the ￿nancial market￿ s condition is relatively
good. These imply that the bubbles bursting explores the "true" economic
condition of each country. In order to sustain high long-run growth rates,
realizing the high quality of the ￿nancial system is important.
Our model could be extended in several directions. One direction would
be to endogenize the pledgeability. In this model, we assume that the level
of the pledgeability is exogenously given. It would be interesting to examine
how the pledgeability is a⁄ected by legal systems or behaviors of ￿nancial
sectors and how these factors a⁄ect the bubble regions. Another direction
would be to extend our model into a two-countries model with di⁄erent
pledgeability levels, and investigate how globalization such as capital account
liberalization a⁄ects the emergence of bubbles in each country. Finally, we
have not analyzed the welfare implications of bubbles, policy-oriented issues
such as government￿ s intervention after bubble bursts, or the role of ￿nancial
market regulations on the emergence of bubbles. These would be promising
areas for future research.32
32Lorenzoni (2008) presents an interesting framework to study policies in the presence of
pecuniary externality which comes from ampli￿cation in asset prices. Analyzing bubbles
within Lorenzoni￿ s framework will be interesting research for understanding regulations
which prevent bubbles or government￿ s intervention after bursts of bubbles.
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Figure 4-1: The effect of bubbles’  bursting in relatively lowθ
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Figure 4-2: The effects of bubbles’  bursting in relatively highθ
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Maximization Problem for the entrepreneur in the bub-
bleless economy
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t are Lagrange multipliers on the borrowing constraint, the
short sale constraint, and non-negative constraint (z￿i





































































































t ￿ 0; x
i







t ￿ 0; z
￿i










t > 0; ￿￿i







t = 0; ￿￿i







t = 0; ￿￿i
t = 0 and ￿
￿i
t > 0:
Proof of Proposition 2
If ￿￿H < ￿L, the growth rate of this economy cannot be equal to the interest
rate and bubbles cannot exist. This situation is the case where > ￿(1 ￿ p)
and ￿ which satis￿es the above condition does not exist. Thus, we focus on
36the cases where ￿￿H ￿ ￿L. When
￿L￿￿f￿L+(￿H￿￿L)pg
￿H(1￿￿) > 0, r￿(￿) = ￿L and
l(r￿(￿);￿) > 0. Since r￿(￿) is a strictly increasing function of ￿, r￿(￿) < ￿L
and bubbles cannot exist if ￿ < ￿ =
￿L￿￿f￿L+(￿H￿￿L)pg
￿H(1￿￿) . On the other hand,




￿H(1￿￿) ￿ 0, ￿ =
0 and r￿(0) ￿ ￿L. But ￿ cannot be negative. Hence, we do not have to
consider the case of ￿ < ￿ and r￿(0) ￿ ￿L as long as ￿ ￿ ￿ = 0. However,
l(r￿(￿);￿) is a decreasing function of ￿ and l(r￿(￿);￿) becomes zero when
￿ = ￿(1 ￿ p) = ￿. Therefore, bubbles can exist as long as ￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿.33
Proof of Proposition 3
If ￿￿H < ￿L, bubbles cannot exist as explained in the proposition 1, and
the growth rate under the bubbleless economy is lower than the interest
rate under the bubbleless economy for any ￿: Next we check the case where








This relation means that at ￿, the growth rate under the bubbleless economy
(the left hand side) is equal to the interest rate under the bubbleless economy
(the right hand side). When ￿ is a little higher than ￿ but smaller than
(1￿p)￿L=￿H, the growth rate under the bubbleless economy becomes higher
than ￿L but the interest rate is still ￿L. Thus, the growth rate is higher than
the interest rate under the bubbleless economy. If ￿ becomes higher than
(1￿p)￿L=￿H, the interest rate becomes ￿￿H=(1￿p) which is higher than ￿L
and the growth rate becomes ￿￿H. Hence, the growth rate becomes lower
than the interest rate when ￿ becomes higher than ￿ ￿ ￿(1￿p). In summary,
the growth rate is higher than the interest rate under the bubbleless economy












; the interest rate, the rate of re-
turn on L-projects and bubbles are the same. Thus, L-entrepreneurs invest in their own
L-projects as well as buy bubbles and lend to H-entrepreneurs.
37Proof of Proposition 4
From (18) and (35), gt = g(￿) = ￿￿H ￿ (￿H ￿ ￿L)￿
￿L(1￿p)￿￿￿H
￿L￿￿￿H , and g￿
t =
r￿(￿) = ￿H (1￿￿)￿+p￿































Furthermore, from the quadratic function (A1), we can derive that gt < g￿
t
if ￿ < ￿
￿, and gt > g￿
t if ￿ > ￿
￿.
Appendix 2: Stochastic Bubbles
This appendix presents stochastic bubbles version of the basic model of Sec-
tion 3. Following Weil (1987), we assume that bubble price becomes zero
(bubble bursts) with probability 1￿￿ at date t conditional on positive bub-
ble price at date t ￿ 1; and once they burst, they never arise again. This
implies that bubbles continue with probability ￿(< 1) and their prices are
positive until they switch to being equal to zero forever. Let Pt be the per
unit price of bubble assets at date t in terms of consumption goods when
bubbles do not collapse at date t.


























































where ~ Pt+1 is a random variable, because bubbles collapse stochastically. As
before, we assume that only a fraction ￿ of the returns from the investment
and the expected return on bubbles can be pledgeable to the creditors.
H-entrepreneurs act much like they do in the deterministic case. On the
other hand, for L-entrepreneurs, their portfolio problem is more complicated
than in the deterministic case. Since bubble assets deliver no return with
probability 1 ￿ ￿, hence L-entrepreneurs may want to hedge themselves by
investing in their L-projects.
































t+1 are the consumption level at date t + 1 when bubbles
continue and collapse at date t + 1; respectively.




































t ): Note that if r￿
t = ￿L; Z￿L
t ￿ 0 and if r￿
t > ￿L; Z￿L
t = 0:
Rearranging (A5) by using the aggregate ￿ ow of funds constraint of date






















t ) if r￿
t > ￿L
: (A6)





> > > <








































+ kt = 1: (A8)
Existence of Stochastic Bubbles
Here following Farhi and Tirole (2010), we restrict our attention to an equi-





Pt ;kt) are constant over time, which
Farhi and Tirole call a conditional bubbly steady state. In this equilibria,
wealth￿ s growth rate, output￿ s growth rate, the interest rate, the rate of
return on bubbles, and bubble share are constant until the bubbles crash.







From (A6)-(A9), we can obtain the conditional bubbly steady state: In
order that the conditional bubbly steady state can exist, the following con-
ditions must be satis￿ed:




t +PtX) > 0 if r￿
t = ￿L: (A11)
From (A10) and (A11), we can obtain the existence condition of the
conditional bubbly steady state.












< ￿ < ￿￿(1 ￿ p):
Compared to the existence condition of deterministic bubbles (Proposi-
tion 2), the condition becomes tightened.
Here we should note two things. The ￿rst one is that if
￿L ￿ ￿
￿





then, even if ￿ = 0; the conditional bubbly steady state can exist.






then, the conditional bubbly steady state can not exist.
Moreover, within the bubble regions, growth e⁄ects of stochastic bubbles
become di⁄erent depending upon ￿:





< ￿ ￿ ￿1; the growth rate
under the stochastic bubble economy is higher than that under the bubbleless
economy. If ￿1 < ￿ < ￿￿(1 ￿ p); the growth rate under the stochastic bubble
economy is lower than that under the bubbleless economy. ￿1 is the greater
value of the following quadratic equation: ￿H ￿[1￿￿(1￿p)]+(1￿￿)￿
1￿￿￿(1￿p) = ￿H ￿L￿p
￿L￿￿￿H +
￿L(￿ ￿
￿L￿p
￿L￿￿￿H):
41